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1.  Introduction 
 
Social security, designed to provide protection against various contingencies, 
is not well suited to the elimination or redress of large-scale, endemic 
poverty, nor is it effective against the deep poverty caused by events such as 
the Great Depression. Social security on its own cannot overcome poverty of 
this magnitude, particularly in developing countries.  For reasons of fiscal 
and administrative capacity, inter alia, social security usually expands 
through piecemeal reforms rather than through grand schemes. The basic 
income grant was, in its conception, just such a grand scheme and its 
proponents’ untempered enthusiasm has unfortunately done harm to the 
cause of social security’s realistic expansion. Now even the Taylor 
Committee, after initial enthusiasm, has accepted that a basic income grant is 
not viable. And so the time has come to return to the job at hand for social 
security: to painstaking and piecemeal analysis, to the careful weighing of 
alternatives, and to informed debate.  
This article attempts to contribute to this end. We show that the South 
African social security system, though very advanced for a country at this 
level of per capita income, still has pervasive gaps in its coverage and is close 
to the limits of its capacities. Yet the Constitution obliges government to 
work towards the progressive expansion of social security and in this article 
we support incremental and targeted social security interventions as the 
strategy most likely to contribute to poverty reduction. We use an analysis of 
1995 income distribution data to assist us in identifying where such social 
security interventions are most likely to have a significant poverty alleviating 
effect. 
Section 2 deals with the nature of the social security system and gives 
an overview of gaps in certain components of the system. Although the 
social security system is not too poorly designed, this section shows that it 
cannot cope with unemployment of the current magnitude which leaves half 
the labour force uncovered by social insurance and increases the burden on 
social assistance. Section 3 analyses poverty from the perspective of social 
security to identify vulnerable groups. Cumulative density functions show 
that, irrespective of where one draws the poverty line, poverty is more severe 
amongst the young (children) than the elderly (who are already fairly well 
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protected by social plus occupational pensions); it is severe amongst the 
broadly defined unemployed which includes discouraged work seekers 
(those who would like to have a job, but have stopped actively looking for 
one, usually because the probability of finding one is extremely small); and 
poverty is endemic in female-headed households. 
Together, Sections 2 and 3 expose the biggest gaps in the system: the 
young, although now partly covered  by child support grants (CSGs); 
discouraged work seekers and the (narrowly) unemployed (some of whom 
may also benefit from the CSG); and those employed, mainly in agricultural 
and domestic employment, who are  not covered by social insurance 
programmes. We argue in Section 4 that, given a somewhat improved fiscal 
position, the time might be ripe for expanding some existing social security 
programmes or for introducing some new ones as a way of improving the 
reach and impact of the social security system. We suggest in this regard: the 
further shifts of funds to the CSG; using the tax system to encourage greater 
coverage of the as yet uncovered employed; and expanding low-wage public 
employment schemes such as the Work-for-Water programme to reach, in 
particular, discouraged work seekers.  
 
 
2.  The social security system: Nature, 
coverage and gaps  
 
The South African social security system consists of two main components: 
social insurance and social assistance. Social insurance covers in the main 
only the employed as it is effectively occupational insurance, membership 
being conditional on contributions by employers and employees. The 
majority of those in formal employment are covered against most 
contingencies, but only as long as their grasp on formal employment remains 
secure. Unemployment prevents many from contributing to occupational or 
private insurance funds for old age, unemployment or disability, thus 
automatically excluding them from coverage.  These individuals can also not 
necessarily access the State-funded social assistance grants, as these grants 
target only very specific categories of people: the very young, the old and the 
disabled.  
This section will focus on the extent to which the social security 
system provides income security to South Africans, both in terms of the 
coverage of different population segments and the magnitude of protection 
that social security arrangements offer. 
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2.1 Provision for Retirement  
 
2.1.1 Social (occupational) insurance for retirement 
In South Africa, strictly speaking, there is no social insurance for retirement, 
but rather a multiplicity of occupational schemes that operate along similar 
actuarial lines to funded private insurance. These schemes are only “social” 
in the sense that compulsory membership has become the norm for most 
formal sector employees, thus for these workers the impact is similar to 
social insurance. Typically, workers and employers each contribute around 
7½% of the former’s monthly earnings to a defined contributions or defined 
benefit pension or provident fund from which workers can claim benefits 
upon retirement. 
Figure 1A shows which segments of the labour force have some degree 
of protection in retirement through membership of retirement schemes. 
Although about 73% of the formally employed were covered in the mid-
1990's (Mouton Commission 1992: 490; Smith Committee 1995: D2.8), 
widespread unemployment, low coverage in certain sectors and the lack of 
coverage in the informal sector meant that only about 45% of the labour force 
was covered (Kruger 1992: 215; Smith Committee 1995: D2.8). The 
unemployed and the informally employed, respectively 25% and 10% of the 
labour force in 1998, are excluded from membership of occupational 
retirement funds. Within the formal sector coverage is low in trade, catering 
and accommodation and it is especially low in agriculture and domestic 
service – sectors with a combined employment of approximately 2.5 million 
or 20% of the labour force in 1997/98 (Statistics South Africa 2000b: Table 
B).  
Even within the covered sectors, benefits are often too low to provide 
effective protection in retirement. 
In the more prevalent defined contributions schemes, benefits are 
determined by the accumulated value of the contributions made by and on 
behalf of the beneficiary. Table 1 shows typical retirement benefits that may 
be accumulated by employees with salaries of R2 000 or R6 000 in a defined 
contributions scheme, assuming a combined employer/employee contribution 
of 15% of salary, a real return of 3% compounded monthly, no real salary 
increases, and a 20 year annuity. It highlights that lower income workers will 
generally receive very low pensions in retirement, unless they manage to 




 example, a worker earning a monthly salary of R2 000 and who has 
contributed for 20 years will receive a retirement benefit of only R546 (plus 
inflation) per month upon retirement – almost twice his monthly 
contributions, but barely a quarter (27%) of his monthly salary.  
 
Table 1: Typical Retirement Benefits at Salaries of R 2000 or 
R6 000  
Years 
contributed 
Capital sum at 
maturity 
20 year annuity Income replace-
ment rate (IRR) 
Salary of R2 000: 
10 R41 923 R232 11.62% 
15 R68 092 R378 18.88% 
20 R98 491 R546 27.31% 
30 R174 821 R970 48.47% 
40 R277 818 R1 541 77.04% 
Salary of R6 000: 
10 R125 769 R697 11.62% 
15 R204 276 R1 133 18.88% 
20 R295 473 R1 639 27.31% 
30 R524 463 R2 909 48.47% 
40 R833 454 R4 622 77.04% 
Source: Own calculations 














The final pension in a defined benefits scheme is usually equivalent to 
the number of years’ membership of the fund multiplied by a certain 
percentage, usually around 2% of final salary (Sanlam 2001). This means that 
a worker who has been a member of a defined benefit fund for 20 years and 
retires with a final salary of R2 000, will have accumulated a final pension of 
R800 per month, or 40% of final salary. This means fairly high replacement 
rates for those who have contributed for most of their economically active 
years.  
 
2.1.2 Social old age pensions 
Those with no or small occupational retirement benefits are eligible for a 
means-tested social old age pension. At present set at R570 per month, it is 
available to men from the age of 65 and women from the age of 60. 
Altogether, 75 to 80%1 of the elderly (Smith Committee 1995: D2.8; Van der 
Berg 1998: 5 & 6; Van der Merwe 1996: 401; Department of Welfare 1996: 
74) or 1.8 million people (Department of Finance 1998: 34) receive old age 
pensions. Take-up rates vary according to the racial and gender 
characteristics and geographic location of the recipients. In 1993, 89% of old 
age pensions were claimed by black households, with nearly a quarter of 
black households receiving an old age pension (Lund 1998: 4). The number 
of coloured and Indian social pensioners was disproportionately large 
compared to their population share, while the means test meant that only 38% 
of elderly whites qualified in 1996 (Van der Berg 1998: 7). Social pensions 
also reach three times as many women as men, reflecting women's lower 
eligibility age, higher longevity and greater poverty, but take-up rates are 
higher for men than for women. Finally, about two thirds of households 
receiving an old age pension are in rural areas.  
 
2.1.3 The articulation between social insurance and social 
assistance 
Table 1 revealed that membership of occupational retirement funds does not 
necessarily provide sufficient income in retirement. The Smith Committee 
(1995: 18) found that 40% of occupational pensions paid had a lower value 
than the old age pension. As a result, some of the elderly draw both 
occupational and social old-age pensions. In 1993, 44.5% of older persons 
benefited from retirement funds and 78.7% from social pensions (Smith 
Committee 1995: D2.8). 
 
                                                 
11 This means that 80% of people eligible by age are receiving benefits. The take-up rate, 
i.e. as percentage of elderly people eligible by age and in terms of the means test, is 
higher, as the means test effectively excludes the wealthier elderly. 
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Lower income workers with insufficient occupational pensions are 
sometimes so penalised by the means test that they receive only slightly 
higher incomes in retirement (when the occupational pension  and the social 
old age pension are combined) than do those who have contributed for much 
shorter periods. Table 2 highlights this: once the receipt of the social old age 
pension is taken into consideration, income replacement rates converge. For 
example, the difference between the income replacement rates for 15 and 20 
years of contributions is halved once the social old age pension is taken into 
consideration. Clearly, the means tested nature of the old age pension reduces 
the incentive for low income earners to belong to a retirement fund (see, for 
example, Van der Berg 1998: 7-83 and Ardington and Lund 1995: 2). 
 
Table 2: Typical Income Replacement Rates of Defined 



















10 R   232 11.6% R  539 R    771 38.6% 
15 R   378 18.9% R  467 R    845 42.2% 
20 R   546 27.3% R  382 R    928 46.4% 
30 R   970 48.5% R  171 R 1 141 57.0% 
40 R 1 541 77.0% R     0 R 1 541 77.0% 
Source: Own calculations 
 
2.2  Unemployment 
 
Protection against unemployment is  provided only to members of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), a contributor-funded social insurance 
scheme. The UIF’s objective is to “alleviate poverty by providing effective 
short-term unemployment insurance to all workers and helping them to find 
reemployment” (Department of Labour 1997a: 5), i.e. to combat the effects 
of frictional unemployment (Department of Labour 1997b: paragraph 372) 
rather than to  focus on the needs of the long-term unemployed. Employers 
and employees each contribute 1% of the employee’s monthly earnings. 
Every week's benefit requires six weeks’ contributions, with a minimum 
contribution period of thirteen weeks. The beneficiary is entitled to a monthly 
benefit equal to 45% of his average income over the last thirteen weeks for a 
maximum period of 26 weeks.  
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Government employees2, domestic workers3, casual and seasonal 
workers4, contract workers, the self-employed, upper income earners5, the 
informally employed  and the unemployed are not eligible for membership of 
the UIF. Figure 1B shows  the proportion of the labour force constituted by 





                                                 
2 Although permanent government employees (10% of the labour force) are not covered 
by the Act, they may draw on their retirement funds during unemployment, although this 
endangers their income security in old age. 
3 There are many obstacles to the inclusion of domestic workers (6% of the labour force), 
e.g. the fact that they often work for multiple employers makes it difficult to administer 
contributions and to ascertain exactly when a domestic worker should be classified as 
unemployed. The Unemployment Bill (Republic of South Africa 2000) envisages further 
investigation of possibilities for the inclusion of domestic and seasonal workers. 
4 Many casual workers do not fulfil the requirement of working at least one full working 
day per calendar week. In addition, both seasonal and casual workers are often not 
employed long enough to accumulate significant benefits. 
5 Above an income ceiling of R97 188 per annum, employees are excluded from 
membership (Department of Labour 2000a), on the assumption that higher income earners 
are generally skilled enough to find new jobs relatively easily and are capable of making 
private provision for unemployment. The Unemployment Insurance Bill (Department of 
Labour 2000b), though, proposes that all income earners be included as contributors, but 
that benefits and contributions be capped at the level that would apply at the threshold of 
R132 000. This should improve the solvency of the Fund and also effect some 
redistribution, as the size of the contributions of this group is large relative to their risk of 
unemployment. (In Figure 2, the previous income ceiling of R84 000 per annum 
pertaining to the late 1990's is used.) 













Compared to contributions paid, UIF benefits are disproportionately high for 
those who have been employed for a relatively short period. For example, a 
worker earning R2 000 per month would have contributed R780 (1.56 times 
his weekly earnings) by the end of three years. If then rendered unemployed, 
he would be eligible for benefits equal to R900 per month (45% of his 
weekly wage) for 26 weeks, i.e. a total of R5 850 (almost 12 weeks’ wages) 
or 7½ times as much as he initially contributed. Until recently the income 
ceiling on membership meant that the maximum benefit that could be paid 
out was R3 645 per month. Under the graduated benefit schedule proposed in 
the Unemployment Insurance Bill (2000b: Appendix Schedule 1), all income 
earners will be included. Monthly benefits will rise from R88 if income is 
less than R150 per month (replacement rate of 58.6% of earnings) to R2 954 
for a monthly income of R7 774 (replacement rate 38.0%). Those earning 
more will face even lower income replacement rates as benefits are capped at 
this level. Although strengthening redistribution within the UIF, 
differentiated replacement rates weaken its role as an instrument of income 




2.3.1  Coverage against disability 
The type of insurance-based protection offered to the disabled depends on the 
origin and nature of the impairment, while social assistance for disability 
differentiates its grants according to the age of the beneficiary. 
Compulsory insurance under the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Amendment Act of 1997 (COIDA) protects most 
formal sector employees against injury or disease that arises in the work 
environment through risk-rated assessments paid by their employers.6 In 
1994, just over 5.5 million employees were covered by the Compensation 
Fund (Department of Labour 1998: 14). Casual and agricultural workers are 
covered and there is no income ceiling on membership, although benefits are 
capped. A substantial portion (more than 55%) of the labour force remains 
excluded from membership. Figure 1C shows that these include the informal 
sector (10%), domestic workers (6%), government employees (10%) and 
workers in industries insured by mutual insurance companies (8%). The 
difficulty with extending coverage to domestic workers is that many perform 
piecework and so not only is there no single employer to whom to pay 
                                                 
6 In addition to coverage by COIDA, employees who contribute to the UIF may, in the 
event of illness – even that which arises outside the workplace – claim unemployment 
benefits provided that the period of illness exceeds two weeks and that they have 
exhausted the paid sick leave provided for under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(Republic of South Africa 2000). 
 9
assessments on their behalf, but it is also difficult to determine under whose 
employ a worker met with injury or disease. Government employees are 
exempt from membership because the  State undertakes to bear their medical 
costs and compensation in the event of a work-place accident (Department of 
Labour 1998: 14). Firms in certain industries such as building and mining are 
also exempt from membership  because particular authorised insurance 
companies, such as Rand Mutual and Federated Employer’s Mutual 
Assurance, carry their risk. Thus, although not members of the Compensation 
Fund, these workers are protected by social security legislation. 
 
Any person who is severely injured in a road accident is eligible for a 
monthly benefit or lump sum payment from the Road Accident Fund, 
financed via a fuel levy. Benefits include compensation for medical expenses, 
catastrophic impairment, loss of income, loss of support and general 
damages. 
For people disabled in circumstances other than those described above 
or in workplaces not covered by COIDA or UIF agreements,  State disability 
grants are the only source of income security. Disability grants of R570 per 
month and  State medical care are provided to all severely physically and 
mentally disabled persons between the ages of eighteen years and 60/65 
(when they qualify for the old age pension), subject to a means test.7 The 
primary care-giver of severely disabled people younger than 18 years can be 
awarded a care-dependency grant of R570 if the child requires full time care 
                                                 
7 The structure of the means test for the receipt of a disability grant is the same as that for 
the old age pension. 
 











and the family’s combined income does not exceed R48 000 (Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry (hereafter CASE) 1998: 34). In addition,  a grant-
in-aid of R110 is paid over and above the disability grant (or the old age 
pension) to adults who require assistance with everyday activities. 
The take-up of such grants is often considered surprisingly low in 
terms of the medical and income eligibility criteria, and is racially and 
geographically skewed. In 2001, 643 000 people were receiving disability 
grants every month (Department of Social Development 2001) – perhaps one 
third of all disabled people, according to some fairly high estimates – but it is 
uncertain what percentage of disabled people who are eligible by age this 
figure represents. Earlier data indicates that the number of disability grants 
paid per 1 000 of the population in the 1990's was 8 among whites, 12 among 
blacks, 23 among Indians and 31 among coloureds (Van der Berg 2001: 196), 
a distribution not explained by disability prevalence.8 High coloured and 
Indian figures may reflect abuse of the system when different apartheid-era 
administrations applied eligibility rules differently. Differential take-up may 
also be influenced by the means test – 19% of white disabled people (again 
under a perhaps wide definition of disability) were employed full time in 
1998, but only 9% of Indian, 6% of black and 4% of coloured disabled 
people (CASE 1999: 30). Take-up varies significantly across provinces -  
from an estimated 71% of disabled people in KwaZulu-Natal to 33% in 
Mpumalanga (CASE 1999: 33) - and is especially low amongst rural people. 
Take-up rates for care-dependency (grants vary in a similar geographic 
fashion from just over 7% in Mpumalanga to 22% in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Barberton 2000: 13-14). Women are under-represented and receive only 
46% of all grants, despite exhibiting higher disability prevalence than men 
(Lund 1998: 6). This under-representation appears even more severe when 
one considers that women’s income tends to be lower and  that women are 
less likely to be working in sectors covered by workers’ compensation. 
Take-up also varies among grant types. Retired disabled people seem 
to have better access to social grants than their younger counterparts (CASE 
1999: 33), which supports the view that the lack of awareness of disability 
grants (relative to social old-age pensions) may be a significant factor 
determining take-up. Take-up of care-dependency grants is low at slightly 
over 14% of the estimated number of severely disabled children (Barberton 
2000: 13-14), with about 31 500 care dependency grants being paid per 
month in April 2001 Department of Social Development 2001). The fiscal 
implications of the possible greater extension of the care-dependency grant to 
children suffering from HIV/AIDS, chronic illness and more moderate 
disability (see for example, Ramklass 2000) are substantial. If the number of 
                                                 
8 According to one estimate, disability prevalence is lowest among coloureds at 4.5% and 
highest among blacks at 6.1% (CASE 1999: 17). 
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HIV positive children under the age of eighteen stabilises at around 424 000, 
Barberton (2000: 18-19) calculates that extension of coverage to the above-
mentioned categories of children will, at 100% take-up, push annual 
expenditure on care dependency grants up to R7.4 billion or, at more 
moderate take-up rates9, up to R1.2 billion – far above the current R146 
million. Finally, the grant-in-aid is probably the most poorly accessed 
benefit. In 1998, 8 719 benefits were paid every month (Ally 1998: 6), 
certainly fewer than the number of people being cared for full-time by family 
members and the community. 
 
2.3.2  Magnitude of protection 
Compensation paid by the Compensation Fund is determined by the 
employee’s earnings and by the severity of the disability. For partial but 
permanent disability, a lump sum payment equivalent to one month’s 
earnings for every 2% disability is  made. If disability is assessed at greater 
than 30%, a monthly pension is paid. This pension is equivalent to 75% of 
monthly earnings for 100% disability and is proportionately reduced for 
lesser disability. The maximum benefit payable is R7 712 and the minimum 
income used for calculating benefits is R1 081. This means that income 
replacement rates are close to 100% for those at the lower end of the income 
spectrum, but well below the 75% mark for higher income earners. The 
temporarily disabled may also access a similarly calculated temporary 
disability payment for a maximum of 12 months. 
The illness benefits provided by the UIF are paid out at the same rate 
as unemployment insurance benefits – 45% of earnings – provided that the 
recipient receives less than one third of his usual income from his employer 
during the period of incapacitation (Department of Labour 1998: 13).  
The Road Accident Fund’s permanent and temporary loss of income 
benefit is set at 75% of pre-accident income. For permanent disability, it is 
proportionately reduced depending on the severity of the disability 
(“percentage permanent impairment”) and the degree of fault of the victim in 
causing the accident (“percentage merit”). The benefit was capped at R3 500 
in 1998 (CASE 1998: 38), but, despite the cap, there remains a rather skewed 
distribution of claims, as the 7% of claims at the upper end of the income 
spectrum account for 62% of the value of the loss of earnings payments made 
(Department of Transport 1998: Chapter 2, section 11.3). Many victims 
receiving compensation also qualify for a disability grant.  
 
Beneficiaries of the disability grant must meet certain medical and 
income eligibility criteria in order to receive the R570 benefit:  
                                                 
9 30% for HIV positive, 14% for severely disabled, 5% for moderately disabled and 15% 
for chronically ill children 
 12
• The disability must be assessed as permanent and severe enough (at least 
50% incapacity) to make the affected person “incapable of entering the 
labour market” (Republic of South Africa 1998: 6, section 3b). Thus, the 
grant can be seen as compensation for loss of earnings. As this disability 
requirement is much higher than that for workers’ compensation, many 
disabled people in sectors not covered by COIDA also do not qualify for a 
State disability grant.  
• The means test gives rise to a similar poverty trap as that for old age 
pensions, providing little incentive to a disabled person to take on work. 
This is a particular problem because the work offered to the disabled tends 
to be temporary and low-paid (Lund 1998: 12), rendering the income 
differential between the wage and the disability grant rather small.  
 
 
2.4  Childhood 
 
Although occupational (social) insurance schemes do not provide any direct 
form of child support, they do give consideration to the extra costs incurred 
by families with children. For example, the UIF provides maternity benefits 
while the Compensation for Occupational Injury and Diseases Act makes 
provision for survivor’s benefits to be paid to the children of deceased 
members. 
Social transfers, such as child support grants, foster care grants and 
care-dependency grants (discussed above) attempt to provide a safety net 
where household income is low, family support is insufficient and common 
and customary law fails single parents.  
The child support grant of R110 per month is payable to the primary 
care-giver of children up to six years. A means test requires that monthly 
household income is below the exclusion threshold of R800 in urban areas 
and R1 100 in rural or informal settlements. The phased implementation of 
the child support grant commenced in April 1998 and numbers are now 
expanding very rapidly. By April 2001, 1.2 million children received the 
child support grant via 757 728 care-givers (Department of Social 
Development 2001). Take-up is still comparatively low in the former 
homelands and rural areas, but the Department expects to exceed its target of 
reaching three million children by 2003 (Department of Social Development 
2001; New Child Support Grant 1997: 2; Republic of South Africa 1997).  
The foster care grant, payable to those temporarily charged with the 
care of children who are not their own, is set at R390 per month. Currently, 
just over 52 000 foster care grants are paid every month (Department of 
Social Development 2001) and the number of applicants is likely to increase 
as the HIV/AIDS epidemic spreads. 
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Although there is no effective marginal rate of taxation imposed on the 
recipients of these benefits (applicants receive either the full grant or no grant 
at all), those close to the exclusion level of income still fall prey to the 
poverty trap, as they stand to lose the entire grant if their income rises just 
above the exclusion level. However, especially for the child support grant, 
the low benefit level mitigates the disincentive to earning alternative income.  
 
 
2.5   Conclusion on the reach of the social 
security system 
 
From this analysis it can be seen that South Africa’s social insurance system  
at present reaches only those in the top half of the income distribution, i.e. 
most of the formally employed. Some of those at the lower end of the income 
distribution are reached by social assistance measures, but the receipt of these 
benefits is contingent on disability prevalence and being at a specific stage in 
the life-cycle, rather than low income only. Thus, a considerable portion of 
people in the middle and bottom of the income distribution cannot be reached 
through existing social security arrangements. There is little social security 
for the long-term unemployed, further widening the gap between those who 
have jobs and those who do not.  
 
 
3.  Poverty and the social security system 
 
Where gaps in social insurance exist, government can intervene through 
providing social assistance. However, limited fiscal means and equity 
objectives make targeting desirable. Targeting often employs a means test or 
uses categorical grants where the social security needs of certain identifiable 
categories of the population (e.g. the elderly, disabled or children) are 
demonstrably large. Sometimes these two targeting systems are used in 
combination, as is the case with old age pensions, disability grants and child 
support grants.  
Poverty analysis is a potentially useful tool to determine where social 
security interventions could be most effective, but hitherto it has seldom been 
used for this purpose in South Africa. Poverty analysis has traditionally been 
restricted to the use of poverty lines, usually set in terms of per capita or per 
adult equivalent income or consumption/expenditure per capita. However, 
these lines are intrinsically subjective, even when all care has been taken to 
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determine them in a seemingly non-subjective manner10, thus it remains 
problematic to use them as the major benchmark for poverty analysis. For 
this reason, analytical attention in poverty analysis has recently shifted to 
Cumulative Density Functions, which plot the income distribution in the 
form of the cumulative proportion of the population below each level of per 
capita expenditure (or whatever other money-metric welfare measure is 
used). If such curves for two groups or time periods do not intersect in the 
poverty-relevant per capita expenditure range, then poverty dominance exists, 
i.e. the one group is always worse off than the other, irrespective of which 
poverty line is chosen and  whether poverty is measured by the headcount 
ratio (P0), the poverty gap index (P1) or the poverty severity index (P2).11  
Figure 2 shows cumulative density curves for per capita expenditure up 
to R3 000 in 1995.12  From the cumulative density curve for children aged 0 
to 6 years, for instance, one can read off on the vertical axis what proportion 
of children belong to households that have a lower per capita income than 
any specified level shown on the horizontal axis,  i.e. at any poverty line 
chosen. For example, if one were to set the poverty line at R1 500 per capita, 
31% of young children (0-6) would be living in "poor" households, compared 
to only 21% of pension-aged adults. The graph clearly shows that the 
proportion of young children in poverty is greater than the proportion of 
pension-aged people (men aged 65 or more and women aged 60 or more) at 
any per capita expenditure level at which the poverty line may be drawn, i.e. 
the cumulative density curve for children always lies above that for the 
pension-aged. The fact that the cumulative density curve for pensioners lies 
below that of the whole population indicates that, generally speaking, there is 
less poverty amongst the former – clear evidence of the value of the social 
old-age pension as a device for reducing poverty amongst older members of 
society.13 Thus, poverty dominance exists, i.e. young children are 
                                                 
10 There are two conventional non-arbitrary ways of determining a poverty line: The first 
determines the poverty line based on the cost of a basket of what is considered basic goods 
and services. The second is composed of a food poverty line, based on the food 
expenditure level at which specified nutritional requirements are usually met, and a non-
food component. (See Woolard & Leibbrandt (2001) for more details on the determination 
of the poverty line in South Africa.) For our purposes, it is important to recognise that 
both methods show a tendency for the poverty line to be higher in wealthier societies. This 
poverty line drift undermines any attempts at representing a poverty line as a fully 
objective measure.  
11 For application of these well-known Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) and other poverty 
analysis to South Africa, see Bhorat et al. (2001). 
12 All cumulative density curves shown are own calculations based on data from the 
October Household Survey/Income and Expenditure Survey 1995. 
13 See also Lund (1993), Case & Deaton (1998) and Ardington & Lund (1995) for further 
evidence of the poverty-ameliorating effect of the old-age pension. 
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systematically poorer than pensioners, and this conclusion holds irrespective 





Figure 2 also suggests that the most effective categorical (i.e. non 
means-tested) social security transfer for alleviating poverty would be one 
directed at children. This includes not only children under 7 years, who are 
currently beneficiaries of the child support grant, but also those in the 7-14 
year age category (the curves for children aged 0-6 and those aged 7-14 are 
indistinguishable on the graph). Such a transfer would be better targeted at 
the poor rather than at the unemployed (narrowly defined)  or at social old-
age pensioners. Although this analysis is based on 1995 data, before the 
institution of the child support grant, which targeted precisely this group 
(young children under 7), widespread child poverty would have remained 
even if 100% take-up of grants  had been realised: grants are small and 
poverty in the 7-14 age category is almost as severe as for younger children.  
In other words, if funds could be made available, even a non-means tested 
child support grant (CSG) would be better than either a grant to all 
individuals or an increase in the existing social old-age pensions. Moreover, 
the CSG should be broadened to include older children.  
It is instructive to expand this analysis to other population segments:  
• Figure 3 shows cumulative density curves for the narrowly unemployed 
and discouraged work seekers, who together constitute the broadly 
unemployed. Poverty amongst the narrowly unemployed is worse than for 
Fig. 2: Cumulative density curves for  total population,  pension 
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the population as a whole at higher poverty lines14, but their situation is 
far better than that of discouraged work seekers. Unlike many of the 
narrowly unemployed, who are often attached to households where other 
members have formal employment, discouraged work seekers often are 
the least educated, women, and located in deep rural areas, where the 
chances of finding a job without migrating are very slim. If they have any 
link to the formal labour market, it is often through remittances by 
migrant workers who have ties to the rural household (Kingdon & Knight 




• Figure 4 shows that poverty is much worse in female-headed than in male-
headed households. Although the international literature has shown that 
this differential is often smaller than conventional wisdom holds16 and is 
often better explained by other characteristics of such households (such as 
                                                 
14 There is poverty dominance only beyond a per capita expenditure level of about R1 300 
15 Kingdon and Knight (2000: 6 & 7) show that discouraged work seekers live in clusters 
where unemployment is higher, are considerably poorer than the searching (narrow) 
unemployed, have much inferior access to water, flush toilets and electricity, and more 
often live in more remote and rural communities. “The non-searching unemployed are, on 
average, the most deprived among all economically active groups.” (Kingdon & Knight 
2000: 6) 
16 An overview of the evidence for ten developing countries concludes that “differences 
between male- and female-headed households (and between males and females) are 
insufficiently large to generalize that females are unambiguously worse off in the entire 
sample of 10 developing countries” (Quisumbing et al. 2001: 29).  
Fig. 3: Cumulative density curves for  narrowly and broadly 
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lower educational levels or rural location) rather than by gender, this does 
not detract from the fact that they are often an identifiably poorer group. 
Indeed, South African evidence reveals that household per capita income 
is 27% lower for households headed by females compared to cases where 
a male head resides at home, after standardising for other factors 





In terms of poverty analysis, then, at least four groups can be identified 
for whom poverty is much worse than for the population as a whole: Young 
children (0-6), older children (7-14), discouraged work seekers, and members 
of female-headed households. This information can assist in devising 
strategies for social security expansion that would have the greatest poverty 
impact. Figure 5 shows that all four of these groups have cumulative density 
curves that lie considerably above that for the population as a whole, 
illustrating their poverty dominance. Any transfer of funds to these groups, 
even if non-means tested, would be better targeted than a general transfer of 
funds to the population as a whole. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Cumulative density curves for  male-headed and female-









R 0 R 500 R 1 000 R 1 500 R 2 000 R 2 500 R 3 000

























































































4.  Limits to coverage: Suggestions for the 
road ahead 
 
Section 2 above has shown the gaps in and intimated the limits to coverage of 
social (occupational) insurance in a society in which regular, well paid formal 
employment is not yet the norm. Even though gradual extension of social 
insurance is indeed desirable and likely, there are limits to extending social 
insurance where remunerative jobs remain scarce. Coverage of the labour 
force is around only 45% in the cases of occupational pensions, the UIF, and 
the Compensation Fund. Clearly, social insurance against income loss as a 
result of old age, frictional unemployment or disability, does not yet cover 
half the labour force. These proportions rise only modestly if we also make 
provision for alternative forms of coverage for specific groups of workers 
(e.g. government employees injured at work, etc.). Moreover, as the 
discussion in Section 2 indicated, the magnitude of the benefits in many cases 
still leaves much of the labour force inadequately protected. 
The large gaps in coverage left by the social insurance system place a 
severe strain on the ability of the social assistance system to provide social 
security to the poor. Indeed, Section 2 showed that the scope of social 
assistance spending in South Africa is relatively large for a developing 
country, especially in the form of  old age pensions, disability grants and 
child support grants. Figure 6, which contrasts social assistance as a 
proportion of GDP in Western European welfare states in 1980 – the height 
of the welfare state – with present South African levels, shows that South 
Africa spends proportionately more than many developed welfare states on 
social assistance. In contrast, welfare states spend a larger share of their 
resources on social insurance, largely paid for by payroll taxes on workers 
and employers and which usually flow through governmental budgets.17 
Fiscal and administrative constraints and the fear of  a possibly 
negative impact on investor and consumer confidence, may prevent the basic 
income grant from becoming a reality. What alternative, more modest social 
security interventions would be appropriate and assist the poor? Given the 
analysis above, three areas of expansion of the social security net would seem 
to be viable options for the near future: 
 
                                                 
1717 In South Africa, in contrast, occupational insurance, although fulfilling the same 
function as social insurance, is not a compulsory tax and is not shown on the government 
budget. Were this the case, South African social security spending ratios would rise 
considerably above their conventionally shown ratios to about 6-7% of GDP, far below 




• Expanding coverage of the social insurance system. To do so by decree in 
the two big areas still largely uncovered – agriculture and domestic 
service, as some propose, may pose a similar threat to jobs in these low 
wage sectors as minimum wage legislation. An alternative would be to 
provide some tax concessions encouraging more employers in these fields 
to provide social insurance. 
• Expanding social assistance:: As was shown in Section 3 above, a very 
promising area for expanding social assistance lies in the direction already 
taken with the child support grants. This programme has understandably 
received much criticism for the slow pace at which it has been expanded 
to cover all the poor. The means test, devised to limit costs and better 
target limited funds, is blamed by some as having acted as a serious 
impediment to the expansion of this programme. If so, the means test 
should perhaps be reconsidered and the means-tested CSG could perhaps 
make way for a universal (i.e. categorical) child grant, which over time 
could be expanded to higher age groups. This would be in line with the 
initial preferences of the Lund Committee. Alternatively, the age limit on 
the CSG could be lifted, with the retention of the means test.  
• Low-wage public employment schemes: Schemes of this nature, such as 
the Work-for-Water campaign, target the poor through self-selection, as 
only the poorest are willing to work for such low wages. Unfortunately 
the administrative costs of such schemes can be large, but with enough 
community participation they can be quite effective in getting some funds 
Fig. 6: Social assistance spending ratio (%  of GDP)

















































































































































































































































































































































Western European average: 1.54%
Source: Alber 1989: Tables 1 & 2; Dept of Finance 1999: Tables 3.1 & 6.6
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to the poor, particularly the many  discouraged work seekers in rural 
areas.  
Such seemingly modest and incremental changes to the social security 
system could help extend its reach and cover some gaps. However, it will 
remain very difficult to plug all holes in the social safety net as long as 
unemployment is rampant. Sustained economic growth remains the 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for substantial poverty reduction.  
But the social security system in South Africa nevertheless provides, 
and should continue to provide, income security to many of the poor. For this 
reason, realistic but serious efforts at incrementally expanding the social 
security system are essential, especially in view of the fact that the fiscal 
discipline of the past few years now gives the government some scope for the 
moderate relaxation of some spending constraints in the areas of greatest 
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